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a b s t r a c t
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases
utilised in everyday language. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong
argument in favour of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in
both cognitive science and philosophy. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing
whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a
function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. Rather than adjudicating between different
grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal methods for determining
a clear dividing line between compositional and non-compositional semantics. Compositionality is
equated with a joint probability distribution modelling how the constituent concepts in the combination
are interpreted. Marginal selectivity is emphasised as a pivotal probabilistic constraint for the
application of the Bell/CH and CHSH systems of inequalities (referred to collectively as Bell-type). Non-
compositionality is then equated with either a failure of marginal selectivity, or, in the presence of
marginal selectivity, with a violation of Bell-type inequalities. In both non-compositional scenarios,
the conceptual combination cannot be modelled using a joint probability distribution with variables
corresponding to the interpretation of the individual concepts. The framework is demonstrated by
applying it to an empirical scenario of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations.
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Humans frequently generate novel associates when presented
with unfamiliar conceptual combinations. For example, in free
association experiments, subjects frequently produce the associate
‘‘slave’’ when cued with the compound ‘‘pet human’’ (Ramm,
2000), but neither ‘‘pet’’ nor ‘‘human’’ will have the same effect
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0022-2496/© 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.when presented individually (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004).
Such cases have sometimes been used to argue that conceptual
combinations have a non-compositional semantics, as it is difficult
to explain how the novel free associate ‘‘slave’’ can be recovered
from its constituent concepts, however, this is a controversial
position;within cognitive science, the question of how to represent
even single concepts is still being debated.
Different positions have been put forward, including the pro-
totype view, the exemplar view, and the theory view. Murphy
(2002) contrasts these positions, asking which is most supported
by the various aspects of cognition related to conceptual process-
ing, e.g., learning, induction, lexical processing and conceptual un-
derstanding in children. He concludes, somewhat disappointingly,
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well documented tension in cognitive science between the com-
positionality and the prototypicality of concepts, which is diffi-
cult to reconcile (Fodor, 1998; Frixione & Lieto, 2012). Arguments
in favour of compositionality centre around the systematicity and
productivity of language; there are infinitely many expressions in
natural language and yet our cognitive resources are finite. Com-
positionality ensures that this infinity of expressions can be pro-
cessed because an arbitrary expression can be understood in terms
of its constituent parts. Since compositionality is what explains
systematicity and productivity, Fodor (1998) claims that concepts
are, and must be compositional, however, such claims are at odds
with well-known prototypicality effects (Fodor, 1998; Frixione &
Lieto, 2012). For example, consider the conceptual combination
PET FISH. A GUPPY is not a prototypical PET, nor a prototypical
FISH, and yet a GUPPY is a very prototypical PET FISH (Hampton,
1997). Therefore, it is hard to imagine how the prototype of PET
FISH can result from some composition of the prototypes of PET
and FISH, which makes the characterisation of concepts in proto-
typical terms difficult to reconcile with compositionality (Fodor,
1998; Hampton, 1997). This supports a view put forward by the
philosopher Weiskopf (2007) when he observed that conceptual
combinations are ‘‘highly recalcitrant to compositional semantic
analysis’’, but even this observation has garnered no general sup-
port.
Here, we approach the problem of non-compositionality from a
novel perspective.We shall show that a suite of sophisticated tools
have already been developed for analysing non-compositionality,
albeit in another field of science. These tools can be naturally
extended to the analysis of concepts, and provide theoretically
justified grounds for deciding whether a particular conceptual
combination can be considered in terms of the semantics of its con-
stituent parts. Specific cases will be discussed where conceptual
combinations can be shown to be non-compositional using these
analytical methods. We begin with a brief review of conceptual
combination as it is currently understood in cognitive science.
1.1. Cognitive theories, compositionality and conceptual combination
The principle of compositionality states that the meanings of
higher order expressions such as sentences are determined from a
combination of the meanings of their constituent parts (Costello
& Keane, 2000; Mitchell & Lapata, 2010). This is a principle
underlying many general theories of language, both natural and
artificial, despite the fact that there is considerable debate about
what the principle actually specifies (e.g., notions of both strong
and weak compositionality appear in the literature (Pelletier,
1994)). A compositional account of conceptual combination is
closely related to the notion that concepts are atomic in nature,
but this assumption of atomicity is difficult to maintain when the
full variety of possible semantic behaviour is considered.
Perhaps most supportive of the principle are those combina-
tions that have an intersective semantics, e.g., the meaning of
BLACK CAT is the intersection of black objects and objects that
are cats. Here, it is possible to apply a conjunction operator be-
tween the two predicates referring to the constituent concepts,
i.e., black(x) ∧ cat(x). Such intersective semantics are composi-
tional, as the semantics of BLACK CAT are determined solely in
terms of the semantics of the constituent concepts BLACK and CAT.
It is tempting to assume thatmost conceptual combinations can be
modelled in this way, however, the study of intersective combina-
tions in cognitive science has revealed that not all conceptual com-
binations display such intersective semantics (Hampton, 1997). For
example, the intersection of ASTRONAUT and PEN in the combi-
nation ASTRONAUT PEN is empty, and therefore its semantics arevacuous, despite its being a conceptual combination that humans
can easily comprehend (Gärdenfors, 2000; Weiskopf, 2007).
A second type of conceptual combination arises when the first
concept modifies the head concept, e.g., in CORPORATE LAWYER,
CORPORATE modifies the more general head concept to give a
sub-category of LAWYER. Schema-based theories of conceptual
combination (Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski, 1996) propose that
the head concept is a schema-structure made up of various
property dimensions (e.g., colour, size, shape, etc.) and relational
dimensions (e.g., habitat, functions, behaviours, etc.). Several
studies have revealed that modification can produce emergent
properties (e.g., in HELICOPTER BLANKET the modification of
BLANKET by HELICOPTER generates associate properties such
as ‘‘water proof’’, ‘‘camouflage’’, and ‘‘made of canvas’’), a
phenomenon which present theories struggle to account for
(Wilkenfeld & Ward, 2001), such behaviour is sometimes viewed
as evidence for non-compositional semantics (Hampton, 1997;
Medin & Shoben, 1988).
Despite these tensions underlying the assumption of compo-
sitionality, virtually all researchers have at least assumed a weak
form of compositionality in their analysis of human language,
where for example, the initial combination process begins with
separate meanings, but is supplemented later by external contex-
tual information (Swinney, Love, Walenski, & Smith, 2007; Wis-
niewski, 1996). For example, in Wisniewski (1996)’s dual process
theory of conceptual combination, a competition occurs between
the processes of relation linking (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as a cross-
ing for zebras), and property mapping (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as
a striped crossing), as the meaning of the compound is decided
upon. This process is affected by the similarity of the constituent
concepts, because similar concepts share many facets and so are
more likely to result in a property interpretation, whereas dissimi-
lar concepts are more likely to be combined using a relational pro-
cess. Thus, ELEPHANT HORSE is more likely to result in a property
interpretation (e.g., a large horse), than ELEPHANT BOX, which is
more likely to result in a relational interpretation (e.g., a box for
holding elephants). This is because similar concepts share many
dimensions (e.g. four legs, similar shape, etc. in the case of ele-
phant and horse) and thus are easier to combine by mapping one
property to another. However, it is important to note that these
processes are all weakly compositional, in the sense that they rely
almost exclusively on the properties of the individual concepts. It is
only later that background knowledge is drawn upon to infer the
possible emergent properties of the new concept. We see people
making assumptions that an ELEPHANT BOX is likely to be made
of a strong material such as wood, and hopefully to contain air-
holes. Swinney et al. (2007) found evidence for this form of weak
compositionality in conceptual combination, when they showed
that for adjectival combinations such as BOILED CELERY the prop-
erties of the individual words such as ‘‘green’’ are activated before
emergent properties such as ‘‘soft’’. However, for the combination
APARTMENT DOG, apartment modifies the ‘‘habitat’’ dimension of
dog rather than its ‘‘size’’ (a dog the size of an apartment), which
in turn shows that background knowledge also plays a role in early
combinatory processes such as slot selection (Murphy, 1988).
Rather than entering this long running debate about the proper
dividing line between weak and strong compositionality, it is our
intention to provide a formal framework to analyse the (non-
)compositionality of conceptual combinations, motivated by the
analysis of composite systems in quantum physics. Importantly,
this framework can be empirically tested. Thus, we feel that it is
possible to shift the above largely theoretical debate onto a more
experimental footing,1 and this article is a step in that direction.
1 Inmuch the sameway as the field of physics entered the realms of experimental
testingwith thework of Bell and Aspect, after decades ofmore philosophical debate
as to the separability and completeness of the quantum formalism (Isham, 1995;
Laloë, 2001).
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within a tiered model of cognition. This will provide a framework
from which a (non-)compositional semantics can be developed in
further sections.
2. Probabilistic approaches to modelling conceptual combina-
tions
It is at the symbolic level of cognition where a significant
portion of the work on compositional semantics can be placed,
because this is where higher order symbolic structures and
associated rules, such as grammar, are processed. A grammar
specifies the parts of a sentence, and the manner in which
they fit together. It makes sense that the semantics attributed
to these primitive parts be intuitive, for example, a noun may
be mapped to a set of entities. However, Zadrozny (1992) has
suggested that it does not actually matter which components are
chosen as primitive, a function can be found that will always
produce a compositional semantics. In Zadrozny’s own words,
‘‘..compositionality, as commonly defined, is not a strong [enough]
constraint on a semantic theory’’. The consequence of this with
respect to the compositional semantics of natural language, and
hence conceptual combination, is that meaning need not be
assigned to individual words, ‘‘we can do equally well by assigning
meaning to phonemes or even LETTERS. . . ’’ (Zadrozny, 1992).
This raises the question about how to appropriately define the
semantics of the language constructs being composed. It turns
out that this is not a straightforward question to answer. In
a well cited and detailed chapter about lexical semantics and
compositionality, Partee (1995) highlights that at the outset
there are disagreements about whether semantics can best be
viewed from the point of view of mathematics or psychology, a
debate that is yet to reach a resolution. For the purposes of this
article we chose to approach the problem of how to semantically
represent concepts from the point of view of psychology, using free
association norms to ground our models.
Consider the concept BAT. One reliable way to seek an
understanding of this concept is via free association experiments
where subjects are cued with the word ‘‘bat’’ and asked to produce
the first word that comes to mind (Nelson, Kitto, Galea, McEvoy,
& Bruza, 2013). Over large numbers of subjects, probabilities
can be calculated that a certain associate is produced. Fig. 1(a)
depicts a subset of data taken from the University of South Florida
word association norms (USF-norms) (Nelson et al., 2004). Upon
examination of this table, we can see that these probabilities
represent two clear senses for the cue ‘‘bat’’; a SPORT sense (with
relevant associates in bold) and an ANIMAL sense. Considering the
full dataset2 allows us to generate the total probability ps of recall
for the sport sense by summing the probabilities of the relevant
associates: ps = 0.25+ 0.05 = 0.30. The rest of the associates all
happen to be relevant to the animal sense of bat, so pa = 0.70.
The same canbe said for the concept BOXER (see Fig. 1(b)where,
once again, the associates relevant to the sport sense of BOXER are
in bold).
Having constructed a model of the individual concepts, we
might ask how the conceptual combination BOXER BAT will be in-
terpreted by a subject. Four interpretations are possiblewithin this
scenario. For example, when BOXER is interpreted as a sport and
BAT as an animal, the corresponding interpretation of the combi-
nation might be something along the lines of a ‘‘furry black animal
with boxing gloves on’’, or perhaps BOXER could be interpreted as
a sport and BAT as a sport leading a subject to interpret the com-
pound as ‘‘a fighter’s implement’’.
2 Available at http://web.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/AppendixC/Matrices.A-B.Fig. 1. (a) Free association probabilities for the word ‘‘bat’’ (a) and the word
‘‘boxer’’ (b).
Conceptual combinations usually have more than one possible
interpretation. Thismay arise from a range of factors, including the
meaning of the concepts themselves (e.g. BOXER canbe interpreted
as a dog, a sportsperson, a pair of shorts, someone who puts things
in boxes, etc.), the sentence in which they appear, the background
of the subject, etc. Different human subjectswill often interpret the
same conceptual combination differently, indeed, the same human
subject, if placed in a new contextmay verywell provide a different
interpretation for the same concept. Thus, it is sensible to approach
the analysis of compositionality probabilistically.
In what follows each concept is assumed to have a dominant
sense and one ormore subordinate senses. The distinction between
the two can be inferred from free association norms such as those
discussed above. For example, the dominance of the sport sense of
BOXER is clearly evident in Fig. 1(a), where the probability associ-
ated with the sport sense is greater than the animal sense, which
leads us to designate the sport sense as ‘‘dominant’’ and the ani-
mal sense as ‘‘subordinate’’. It should be noted, however, that the
distinction between ‘‘dominant’’ and ‘‘subordinate’’ senses is not
necessary for the theory presented below, rather it is an explana-
tory aid.
Standard probabilistic reasoning suggests that if two ambigu-
ous concepts A and B have behaviour that can be considered as
compositional, then it should be possible to describe this behaviour
in terms of sets of dichotomous random variables. In the dom-
inant/subordinate scenario introduced above this would lead to
four randomvariables {A1,A2} and {B1, B2}, ranging over two val-
ues {+1,−1}, where we have used the numbers 1 (dominant) and
2 (subordinate) to refer to the senses that are used to prime to their
respective concepts A and B in an experiment.
Now, if a human subject is first primed with the word
‘‘vampire’’ and subsequently asked to interpret the compound
BOXER BAT, then they may be oriented towards giving an animal
interpretation of the concept BAT (which could in turn influence
their interpretation of BOXER). This suggests a minimal natural
extension of the model where A1 = +1 represents a situation
where the subject was first primed with a word representing
the dominant sense of concept A (e.g. for BAT this could be
‘‘vampire’’) and concept Awas indeed subsequently interpreted in
this dominant sense by a human subject when they are asked to
give an interpretation for a conceptual combination. Conversely,
A1 = −1 represents the case where the subject was primed
with the dominant sense of concept A but Awas not subsequently
interpreted in that sense. Similarly,A2 = ±1 represents a situation
where a subordinate sense of concept A was primed, and concept
A was ( + 1) or was not (−1) interpreted in this sense. Note
that a concept may have more than one subordinate sense. For
example, the concept BOXER could be considered to have an extra
subordinate sense indicative of clothing, namely ‘‘boxer shorts’’.
This point can be incorporated into the above formalism based on
a primary and subordinate senses by allowing that the concept A
can be interpreted in a third (or more) senses. Thus, A1 = −1
P.D. Bruza et al. / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 26–38 29Fig. 2. A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed
components A and B. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive
choice of experiments performed upon those components, one represented by the
random variables A1,A2 (pertaining to an interaction between the experimenter
and component A), and the other by B1, B2 (pertaining to an interaction between
the experimenter and component B). Each of these experiments can return a value
of+1 or−1.
can occur because the concept primed by A1 is interpreted in the
subordinate sense (as above), or in a third sense not directly primed
by the experimental arrangement.
Priming thus allows for the experimental control of the con-
textual cues influencing conceptual combinations. This is impor-
tant because conceptual combinations always appear in a context
(e.g., a discourse context), which affects how they will ultimately
be interpreted. Fig. 2 gives a general representation of the reason-
ing used in the construction of the above probabilistic scenario.
A ‘black box’ is depicted, with two proposed components, A and
B, inside it. Two different experiments can be carried out upon
each of the two presumed components, which will answer a set
of ‘questions’ with binary outcomes, leading to four experimental
scenarios. For example, one experimental scenario would be to ask
whether subjects return an interpretation of the conceptA that cor-
responds to the primeA1 and similarly for B in relation to the prime
B2. What analysis can be brought to bear upon such a situation?
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments
will have a statistical distribution over all available outcomes. In
what follows, we shall aim to develop a general mathematical
apparatus that can be used to discover whether the presumed
sub-components can be considered as isolated, influencing one
another, or in some sense irreducible. We shall do this through a
consideration of the joint probability distribution of the variables
A1,A2, B1, and B2, PrA1,A2,B1,B2, which can be used to model the
behaviour of the experimental black box. While this analysis will
be performed using conceptual combinations, we emphasise that
this black box is potentially very general and that the analysis de-
veloped here can be applied to far more than the analysis of lan-
guage.
We start by noting that if priming two concepts A and B
using two senses of each concept, then we can construct 16 joint
probabilities, corresponding to all the possible interpretations that
a subject might return, across four possible priming conditions
corresponding to two senses for each concept:
p1 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1, B1 = +1) p2 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1, B1 = −1)
p3 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1, B1 = +1) p4 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1, B1 = −1)
p5 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1, B2 = +1) p6 ≡ Pr(A1 = +1, B2 = −1)
p7 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1, B2 = +1) p8 ≡ Pr(A1 = −1, B2 = +1)
p9 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1, B1 = +1) p10 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1, B1 = −1)
p11 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1, B1 = +1) p12 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1, B1 = −1)
p13 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1, B2 = +1) p14 ≡ Pr(A2 = +1, B2 = −1)
p15 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1, B2 = +1) p16 ≡ Pr(A2 = −1, B2 = −1).
(1)
These sixteen probabilities can be set out in an array as follows:A
A1 +1−1
A2 +1−1
B
B1
+1 −1
B2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16
 . (2)
This matrix lists the different priming conditions in a set of four
blocks, which allows us to consider the structure of the probabili-
ties describing the likely interpretation of a given conceptual com-
bination. Observe how the matrix is complete, in that it covers all
possible priming conditions across the two concepts for this sce-
nario.
In what follows we will show how this matrix can be used to
determine whether a conceptual combination is compositional, or
not. We start by considering what might be required in order for a
conceptual combination to be deemed compositional.
2.1. Compositional semantics
Were the semantics of the conceptual combination AB to be
compositional, how would this be reflected in its probabilistic
structure? The principle of semantic compositionality would sug-
gest that the joint probability distribution could be recovered from
the probability distributions constructed using each individual
concept.
Thus, we shall take a given conceptual combination AB to be
compositional if and only if a fourway joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2
exists where PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈ {1, 2} are marginal distributions. This
opens the door to define non-compositionality via an unusual
means, namely the inability to construct a joint probability
distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 in this way.
2.2. Non-compositional semantics
To analyse non-compositionality we draw upon results from
the field of quantum theory surrounding entangled systems (see
e.g. Laloë (2001) for a comprehensive review of the quantum for-
malism). This step is not as arbitrary as it might at first sight. An
entangled system is one for which it is not always possible to con-
struct a four way joint distribution from four empirically collected
pairwise joint distributions. Of particular interest for the current
argument, Fine’s theorem (Fine, 1982) states the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for existence of a joint probability distribution,
and hence the notion of compositionality introduced at the end of
the previous section.
Fine Theorem 3 (Fine, 1982). If A1,A2, B1, B2 are bivalent
random variables with joint distributions PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then
necessary and sufficient for a joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 is that the
following system of inequalities is satisfied:
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B1)+ Pr(A1, B2)+ Pr(A2, B2)
− Pr(A2, B1)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0 (3)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B1)+ Pr(A2, B2)+ Pr(A1, B2)
− Pr(A1, B1)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B2) ≤ 0 (4)
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B2)+ Pr(A1, B1)+ Pr(A2, B1)
− Pr(A2, B2)− Pr(A1)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0 (5)
−1 ≤ Pr(A2, B2)+ Pr(A2, B1)+ Pr(A1, B1)
− Pr(A1, B2)− Pr(A2)− Pr(B1) ≤ 0, (6)
where Pr(Ai, Bj) is shorthand for Pr(Ai = +1, Bj = +1), Pr(Ai) for
Pr(Ai = +1) and Pr(Bj) represents Pr(Bj = +1), i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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inequalities, but they hark back to the separability assumption
made in Bell’s original theorem (Bell, 1964) and we will refer to
this class of inequalities as Bell-type inequalities. Fine’s theorem
permits us to analyse compositionality from a formal perspective
that is open to experimentation. According to this approach, a
conceptual combination AB is deemed ‘‘non-compositional’’ when
the four pairwise joint probability distributions in (2) do not satisfy
the Bell-type inequalities provided by Fine’s theorem. This scenario
implies that a joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 cannot be formed such
that the four pairwise joint probability distributions PrAi,Bj, i, j ∈
{1, 2} are marginal distributions. Conversely, if all inequalities are
satisfied then the fourway joint probability distribution does exist,
and the conceptual combination can be deemed ‘‘compositional’’ in
the measurement context.
Physical systems adhere to a constraint variously termed ‘‘the
causal communication constraint’’, ‘‘parameter independence’’,
‘‘simple locality’’, ‘‘signal locality’’, or ‘‘physical locality’’ (Maudlin,
1994). This is due to the constrictions of a theory independent
from quantum theory; Special Relativity. All physical systems
that are spatially separated should behave in such a way that
‘‘the probability of a particular measurement outcome on any
one part of the system should be independent of which sort of
measurementwas performed on the other parts’’ (Cereceda, 2000).
Such conditions are termed ‘‘marginal selectivity’’ (Dzhafarov &
Kujala, 2012) in cognitive systems, and it is necessary for a system
to satisfy them before it can be considered surprising that this
system does not satisfy the Bell-type inequalities. Thus, we must
have a reason to believe that a system should be considered
separable before we can be shocked to find that it is not. For
example, with respect to the conceptual combination BOXER BAT,
marginal selectivity entails the interpretation of BAT does not
change when the primes of BOXER are varied from ‘‘fighter’’ to
‘‘dog’’. This is a first indication that the two concepts could perhaps
be modelled compositionally.
Marginal selectivity is expressed more formally as follows:
Pr(Ai = +1) = Pr(Ai = +1, B1 = +1)
+ Pr(Ai = +1, B1 = −1)
= Pr(Ai = +1, B2 = +1)
+ Pr(Ai = +1, B2 = −1), i ∈ {1, 2} (7)
Pr(Bj = +1) = Pr(A1 = +1, Bj = +1)
+ Pr(A1 = −1, Bj = +1)
= Pr(A2 = +1, Bj = +1)
+ Pr(A2 = −1, Bj = +1), j ∈ {1, 2}. (8)
Note how these four equations express that the interpretation of
the concept represented by the marginal probability is stable with
respect to how the other concept is primed (e.g., Pr(Ai = +1)
is stable with respect to the different primings of concept B as
represented by B1 and B2).
Recently, Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have established a
connection between Fine’s theorem and the theory of selective
influences in psychology, a result that suggests that Fine’s theorem
can be usefully applied to cognitivemodels. In amodelwith several
factors and a set of randomvariables describing responses, selective
influence concerns the problem of what factors influence what
variables. The interpretation of conceptual combinations within a
priming scenario can be treatedwith amodel of selective influence,
with primes corresponding to the factors affecting randomvariable
corresponding to the interpretation of concepts. Dzhafarov and
Kujala (2012) point out that selective influence implies marginal
selectivity. Failure of marginal selectivity means there can be no
model of selective influence, meaning there is no joint probability
distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 where the pairwise distributions PrA1,B1,
PrA1,B2, PrA2,B1, PrA2,B2 are marginal distributions.The proof of Fine’s theorem assumes locality, which is the
physical equivalent of marginal selectivity for spatially separated
physical systems (including the entangled systems of photons that
occur in quantumphysics). In cognitive science, however, concepts
are not as well behaved as photons, so marginal selectivity may
or may not hold. This is a crucial point. There has been some
confusion about what characteristics a cognitive system should
have before it can be modelled using Bell type inequalities. For
example, Aerts, Gabora, and Sozzo (2013) present an experiment to
establish whether the concepts ANIMAL and ACTS are ‘‘entangled’’
in the expression ‘‘The Animal Acts’’. Placed within the framework
presented in this paper, the goal of the experiment was to
determine whether the conceptual combination ANIMAL ACTS is
compositional, or not. The authors employed the CHSH inequality
and achieve a violation, and so claim that the combination
is ‘‘entangled’’, i.e., non-compositional. However, a subsequent
analysis of the experiment showed that marginal selectivity does
not hold (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2014), which means that the non-
compositionality is in a certain sense trivial (the system should
never have been modelled using compositional methods to start
with).
For applications in cognitive science, marginal selectivity must
be tested first, before any Bell-type inequality can be appropriately
applied:
1. If marginal selectivity fails, then the conceptual combination is
immediately judged as ‘‘non-compositional’’.
2. If marginal selectivity holds and any of the Bell-type inequal-
ities are violated, then the conceptual combination is deemed
‘‘non-compositional’’.
3. If marginal selectivity holds and all of the Bell-type inequali-
ties hold, then the conceptual combination is deemed ‘‘compo-
sitional’’.
Quantum physics has explored a number of equivalent
formulations of the locality condition that is termed marginal
selectivity in psychology (including the: Bell; Clauser–Horne (CH);
and Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) forms (Laloë, 2001)). Of
particular interest to the present argument, the CHSH inequality
provides a formulation based on correlations between systems
A and B, and so permits some insight to be gained into why
conceptual combinations might be noncompositional even if they
satisfy marginal selectivity in an experiment.
The CHSH inequality deals with expectation values rather than
probabilities, and can be written as (Cereceda, 2000; Laloë, 2001):
−2 ≤ E(A1, B1)+ E(A1, B2)+ E(A2, B1)− E(A2, B2) ≤ 2 (9)
where E(Ai, Bj) i, j ∈ {1, 2} is a correlation function corresponding
to the expectation value of a measurement of the experimental
scenario depicted in Fig. 2.3 Expectation values can be computed
from the matrix of probabilities (2), e.g., E(A1, B1) = p1 + p4 −
(p2+p3). Recalling from (1) that p1 = Pr(A1 = +1, B1 = +1) and
p4 = Pr(A1 = −1, B1 = −1), we recognise that p1 corresponds
to a situation where concepts A and B have both been interpreted
in their dominant sense, when in both cases the dominant sense
of each concept has been primed. Similarly, p4 corresponds to
both A and B being interpreted in a subordinate sense when the
dominant sense of each concept has been primed. Thus, p1+p4 = 1
occurs when the senses of the constituent concepts are perfectly
correlated within the given priming condition.
For example, assuming that the fruit sense of the concept APPLE
was primed, along with the food sense of CHIP. Perfect correlation
3 We note that the expectation values used in these equations consider products.
Thus Suppes, Acacio de Barros, and Oas (1998) write E[AiBj]. However, as the
CHSH inequality is most commonly written in the E(Ai, Bj) form we have kept this
notation throughout this paper to minimise confusion.
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(1) when APPLE is interpreted as a fruit CHIP is always interpreted
as food (p1) and, (2) when APPLE is not interpreted as fruit, CHIP
is not interpreted as food (p4). The combination of these two
conditions implies that p1 + p4 = 1 and p2 + p3 = 0. Conversely,
p2+ p3 = 1 occurs when the senses are perfectly anti-correlated. If
we assume the fruit sense of APPLE is primed and CHIP is primed
in its electronic circuit sense then perfect anti-correlation of senses
means twonewconditions hold: (3)WhenAPPLE isnot interpreted
as a fruit, CHIP is always interpreted as a circuit (p3), and (4) when
APPLE is interpreted as fruit, CHIP is not interpreted in its circuit
sense (p2).
The expectation value E(Ai, Bj) computes the degree to which
the senses of the constituent concepts are (anti-)correlating. The
arrangement of probabilities in figure (2) is not significant. There
are thus four possible ways to arrange the quadrants, with each
arrangement leading to a variant of the CHSH inequality:
−2 ≤ E(A1, B1)− E(A1, B2)+ E(A2, B1)+ E(A2, B2) ≤ 2 (10)
−2 ≤ E(A1, B1)+ E(A1, B2)− E(A2, B1)+ E(A2, B2) ≤ 2 (11)
−2 ≤ −E(A1, B1)+ E(A1, B2)+ E(A2, B1)+ E(A2, B2) ≤ 2. (12)
Therefore, there are four CHSH inequalities in total (9)–(12), each
differing in where the minus sign is placed. The heart of each
inequality is a computation involving correlations which will be
referred to as the CHSH value. When the CHSH value of any of
the inequalities lies outside of the range [−2, 2], meaning its ab-
solute value is greater than 2, then there is no joint probability
distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 such that the four empirically collected
pairwise distributions PrA1,B1, PrA1,B2, PrA2,B1, PrA2,B2 are marginal
distributions. In such a case, the associated conceptual combina-
tion is deemed ‘‘non-compositional’’.
Conversely, when the CHSH value lies within [−2, 2] for all four
inequalities, there is a joint probability distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2
where the four empirically collected pairwise distributions:
PrA1,B1, PrA1,B2, PrA2,B1, PrA2,B2 are marginal distributions. In this
case, the conceptual combination is deemed ‘‘compositional’’.
When marginal selectivity holds, the CHSH inequalities and
Bell/CH inequalities are algebraically equivalent. However, as the
CHSH inequalities are based on correlations, they offer a means
to explain non-compositionality in terms of correlations between
senses. As was the case with Fine/CH inequalities, marginal selec-
tivity must first be tested before the four CHSH inequalities can be
applied. Thus, in QT we have found a probabilistic formalism that
allows for the assumption of compositionality to be tested. If a sys-
temof probabilistic relationships can be constructed for a cognitive
scenario (or any other scenario thatmatches the structure depicted
in Fig. 2) then we can test whether it should be deemed composi-
tional. Non-compositionality would then be determined by the in-
ability to construct a joint probability distributions across the four
variables modelling how the primary and a subordinate sense of
the concepts A and B are interpreted. We now illustrate how these
probabilistic methods for analysing compositionality can be de-
ployed in an experimental setting.
3. Empirical illustration
3.1. Subjects
Sixty-five subjects were recruited from the undergraduate psy-
chology pool at Griffith University and received credit for their par-
ticipation. Only native English speakers were selected in order to
remove the possibility that the interpretation of conceptual com-
binations would be confounded by language issues.3.2. Design and materials
We utilised four different priming regimes in order to generate
the four different experimental scenarios suggested by Fig. 2. In
these experiments, subjects were first primed and then presented
with a non-lexicalised conceptual combination which they were
asked to interpret, also designating the senses that were used in
that interpretation (see Fig. 3). A probabilistic analysis was then
performed upon the data so obtained. Subjects were presented
with twenty-four ‘true’ conceptual combinations (see below for
an explanation), and so participated in twenty-four test trials.
Table 2 lists the set of conceptual combinations used, as well as
the corresponding primes.
Primes were selected from the USF free association norms (Nel-
son et al., 2004) and the University of Alberta norms of homo-
graphs (Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark, 1994). The majority of
primes were selected from the USF norms. The procedure for se-
lecting primes from these norms was to view a potential prime as
a cue which produces the required concept as an associate with a
high probability. As an example, ‘‘money’’ was chosen from theUSF
norms to prime the financial sense of BANK as ‘‘bank’’ is produced
as a free associate of the cue ‘‘money’’ with high probability. Simi-
larly, ‘‘river’’ was chosen to prime the natural sense of BANK. Occa-
sionally when a particular sense was not present in the USF norms,
we drew upon the University of Alberta norms. Importantly, the
USF norms were used to avoid cues such as ‘‘account’’ which are
associated with both BANK and LOG, thereby minimising the pos-
sibility of priming more than one concept at a time. Specific con-
ceptual combinations were chosen with the expectation that the
ambiguity of constituents would allow a number of alternative in-
terpretations, where each interpretation arose from a different at-
tribution of meaning to the underlying sense of the ambiguous
concepts (Costello & Keane, 1997).
A single factor design was used, which analysed responses
to non-lexicalised conceptual combinations under priming condi-
tions that varied between subjects. A subject was assigned to one
of four priming conditions for each presented conceptual combi-
nation. For example, the four priming conditions for BANK LOG
are (1) ‘‘money’’ and ‘‘journal’’ (A1 − B1), (2) ‘‘money’’ and ‘‘tree’’
(A1 − B2), (3) ‘‘river’’ and ‘‘journal’’ (A2 − B1), or (4) ‘‘river’’ and
‘‘tree’’ (A2− B2). This assignment of primes was based upon a be-
tween groups Latin square design, such that for the 24 combina-
tions, each participant completed each priming condition 6 times.
3.3. Procedure
Fig. 3 shows a schematic illustration of the procedure followed
during a test trial. Participants completed 3 practice trials, 24 test
trials and 24 filler trials. All trials were composed of six phases,
consisting of three initial time-pressured tasks followed by three
non-timed tasks. The time limitation of the first three phases
was introduced with the expectation that this would maximise
the effectiveness of the priming. The experiment took around
20–30 min to complete, and participants pushed the ENTER key
to begin each trial.
Phases 1–2:
Two consecutive double lexical decision tasks were carried out,
where participants were asked to decide as quickly as possible
whether two letter strings, a prime and the concept to be presented
as a part of the compound given in Phase 3, were legitimate words,
or if one of the strings was a non-word. Each lexical decision
consisted of the two letter strings presented in the centre of screen,
one below the other in order to discourage participants from
interpreting the two words as a phrase. Participants responded to
the decision tasks by pushing a button on the keyboard, labelled
‘word’ or a button labelled ‘non-word’ (left arrow and right arrow
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sequence of squares moving from left to right shows the experimental flow, with each square a representation of the screen shown to a participant. Note: the figure does
not show the exact text given to participants, and stimuli are not to scale.keys respectively). For instance, if given the strings ‘‘coil’’ and
‘‘spring’’, then participants were expected to decide that both
strings were words and so push the ‘word’ key, whereas if given
‘‘grod’’ and ‘‘church’’ then participants were expected to decide
that they had been shown a non-word and to push the ‘non-word’
key. For all of the test trials participants received two phases of
word–word strings. The response ratio for the two priming phases
was: 50% word → word (test trial), 25% non-word → non-word
(filler trial), 12.5% word→ non-word (filler trial), 12.5% non-word
→ word (filler trial). In phases where a non-word was present,
it appeared equally often in the top or the bottom portion of the
screen.
The double-lexical decision taskwas used to associate the prim-
ing word and test word together without participants interpret-
ing them as a compound (Gagne, 2001). This procedure isolates
the experimental priming to each concept in the combination. For
example, the lexical decision task applied to ‘‘coil’’ and ‘‘spring’’
was designed to prime the coil sense of the concept SPRING in the
conceptual combination SPRING PLANT. The order of the two dou-
ble lexical decision tasks was counter-balanced, so that half were
presented in the same order as the compound words (e.g., ‘‘coil’’
and ‘‘spring’’ were first presented, then ‘‘factory’’ and ‘‘plant’’) and
half were presented in the reverse order (e.g., first ‘‘factory’’ and
‘‘plant’’ were presented for lexical decision, followed by ‘‘coil’’ and
‘‘spring’’).
Phase 3:
A conceptual combination was presented in the centre of the
screen (e.g., ‘‘spring plant’’). Participants were asked to push the
space bar as soon as they thought of an interpretation for the
compound. Filler compounds were included for the filler (i.e., non-
word) trials so as not to disrupt the participant’s rhythm inmaking
two lexical decisions followed by an interpretation.
Phase 4:
Participants were asked to type in a description of their
interpretation.
Phases 5–6:
Two disambiguation tasks were carried out, where participants
chose what sense they gave to each word from a list (e.g., plant =
A. ‘a living thing’; B. ‘a factory’; C. ‘other’).3.4. Results
Experimental subcomponents utilising non-words were dis-
carded during the analysis. In total, 91.5% of the interpretations
provided by the subjects fell within one of the four primed senses
of the studied conceptual combinations.
As stated previously, in order to apply Bell-type inequalities
for compositional analysis, marginal selectivity must first be
tested. Table 1 depicts an analysis of marginal selectivity where
the values in the columns depict the difference of marginal
probabilities across the conditions of the associated variable, as
well as the confidence intervals. For example, diff(A1) is the
difference between the one-marginal Pr(A1 = +1, B1 = +1) +
Pr(A1 = +1, B1 = −1) and the second one-marginal Pr(A1 =
+1, B2 = +1) + Pr(A1 = +1, B2 = −1). Marginal selectivity
holds when these differences are zero across all four variables.
The breadth of the confidence intervals and the fact that many
are not centred around zero does not allow us to conclude with
confidence that any of these conceptual combinations satisfy
marginal selectivity, although BATTERY CHARGE, BILL SCALE and
TOAST GAG could possibly be adhering to this condition as the
differences in marginal probabilities are low, and their confidence
intervals are overlap 0 for all values of diff. However, the sample
size is small (see Table 2) and so we cannot be confident that this
condition is satisfied. However, for the purposes of illustration, we
will assume in the analysis to follow that these three combinations
do satisfy marginal selectivity.
The result of the compositional analysis is depicted in Table 2.
We have tentatively flagged combinations as ‘‘non-compositional’’
if they appear likely to fail marginal selectivity given the current
dataset. Of the combinations that are assumed to satisfy marginal
selectivity, BILL SCALE (|CHSH| = 1.63) and TOAST GAG
(|CHSH| = 1.63) are deemed ‘‘compositional’’ as their CHSH
values are less than or equal to 2. BATTERY CHARGE shows a slight
violation of the CHSH inequalities (|CHSH| = 2.01), so could be
deemed ‘‘non-compositional’’, but due to the lack of confidence in
whether marginal selectivity is holding, we cannot make any firm
conclusions. More experiments will be required.
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Analysis of marginal selectivity. Values represent differences of marginal probabilities with associated 95% confidence
interval (obtained using a 2-sample test for equality of proportions with continuity correction). BATTERY CHARGE, BILL
SCALE and TOAST GAG are starred (*) as they are assumed to satisfy marginal selectivity.
Combination diff (A1) diff (A2) diff (B1) diff (B2)
Boxer bat 0.175 [−0.19,0.30] 0.140 [−0.32,0.50] 0.338 [−0.04,0.71] 0.158 [0.25,0.57]
Bank log 0.055 [−0.22,0.32] 0.092 [−0.27,0.42] 0.338 [0,0.67] 0.257 [−0.08,0.60]
Apple chip 0.250 [−0.02,0.52] 0.114 [−0.28,−0.51] 0.294 [−0.01,0.61] 0.217 [−0.17,0.61]
Stock tick 0.163 [−0.24,0.57] 0.085 [−0.30,0.48] 0.488 [0.11,0.85] 0.386 [0.02,0.74]
Seal pack 0.083 [−0.30,0.47] 0.213 [−0.10,0.37] 0.162 [−0.21,0.53] 0.221 [−0.18,0.63]
Spring plant 0.294 [0.01,0.57] 0.133 [−0.13,0.41] 0 [0,0] 0.173 [−0.12,0.46]
Poker spade 0.136 [−0.21,0.48] 0.035 [−0.28,0.35] 0 [−0.29,0.29] 0.113 [−0.26,0.48]
Slug duck 0.096 [−0.31,0.52] 0.153 [−0.21,0.52] 0.133 [−0.22,0.48] 0.026 [−0.34,0.38]
Club bar 0.133 [−0.10,0.37] 0 [−0.23,0.23] 0.125 [−0.10,0.35] 0.138 [−0.16,0.44]
Web bug 0.210 [−0.18,0.60] 0.067 [−0.30,0.44] 0.296 [−0.10,0.69] 0.153 [−0.21,0.52]
Table file 0.058 [−0.21,0.32] 0.235 [−0.27,0.32] 0.114 [−0.25,0.40] 0.113 [−0.26,0.48]
Match bowl 0.137 [−0.26,0.54] 0.250 [−0.12,0.62] 0.075 [−0.23,0.38] 0.022 [−0.33,0.37]
Net cap 0.035 [−0.29,0.36] 0.092 [−0.31,0.49] 0.059 [−0.30,0.51] 0.175 [−0.34,0.43]
Stag yarn 0.375 [0.02,0.73] 0.219 [−0.12,0.56] 0.104 [−0.26,0.43] 0.045 [−0.30,0.39]
Mole pen 0.125 [−0.16,0.41] 0.021 [−0.33,0.37] 0.063 [−0.34,0.46] 0.3 [−0.08,0.68]
Battery charge* 0.067 [−0.21,0.35] 0.048 [−0.28,0.37] 0.117 [−0.22,0.45] 0.120 [−0.23,0.43]
Count watch 0.195 [−0.14,0.53] 0.063 [−0.25,0.38] 0.011 [−0.26,0.28] 0.063 [−0.29,0.41]
Bill scale* 0.081 [−0.30,0.46] 0.113 [−0.26,0.48] 0.054 [−0.26,0.37] 0.051 [−0.24,0.34]
Rock strike 0.188 [−0.07,0.44] 0.117 [−0.22,0.45] 0.313 [0.02,0.60] 0.013 [−0.28,0.30]
Port vessel 0.106 [−0.29,0.50] 0.085 [−0.31,0.48] 0.113 [−0.26,0.48] 0.118 [−0.19,0.43]
Crane hatch 0.141 [−0.15,0.44] 0.296 [−0.10,0.69] 0.149 [−0.18,0.48] 0.233 [−0.16,0.63]
Toast gag* 0.0625 [−0.12,0.24] 0.008 [−0.32,0.34] 0.018 [−0.35,0.38] 0.015 [−0.34,0.38]
Star suit 0.308 [−0.02,0.64] 0.163 [−0.25,0.48] 0.054 [−0.26,0.37] 0.058 [−0.20,−0.32]
Fan post 0.35 [−0.04,0.74] 0.125 [−0.28,0.53] 0.025 [−0.34,0.39] 0.188 [−0.20,0.57]Table 2
Results of the compositionality analysis: ‘Y/N’ indicateswhether the conceptual combination is compositional, or notN
the number of subjects. Conceptual combinations adhering tomarginal selectivity have CHSH value shown in brackets.
Combination Concept A Concept B Results
Prime 1 (A1) Prime 2 (A2) Prime 3 (B1) Prime 4 (B2) Compositional N
Boxer bat dog fighter ball vampire N 64
Bank log money river journal tree N 64
Apple chip banana computer potato circuit N 65
Stock tick shares cow mark flea N 64
Seal pack walrus envelop leader suitcase N 64
Spring plant summer coil leaf factory N 64
Poker spade card fire ace shovel N 65
Slug duck snail punch quack dodge N 63
Club bar member golf pub handle N 64
Web bug spider internet beetle computer N 63
Table file chair chart nail folder N 63
Match bowl flame contest disk throw N 64
Net cap gain volleyball limit hat N 65
Stag yarn party deer story wool N 61
Mole pen dig face pig ink N 63
Battery charge car assault volt prosecute ? [2.01] 63
Count watch number dracula time look N 65
Bill scale phone pelican weight fish Y? [1.63] 64
Rock strike stone music hit union N 63
Port vessel harbour wine ship bottle N 65
Crane hatch lift bird door egg N 63
Toast gag jam speech choke joke Y? [1.23] 63
Star suit moon movie vest law N 62
Fan post football cool mail light N 633.5. Discussion
In this discussion we provide further details with the aim of
shedding light on how the joint probability distribution is struc-
tured and what this might mean when a violation of composition-
ality occurs. We shall utilise two examples: TOAST GAG and APPLE
CHIP.TOAST GAG
Matrix (13) depicts the empirical results for TOAST GAG. Here,
we see no particular ordering or patterns. In particular, when
we compare the form of the equation required for a violation of
Eqs. (9)–(12) and the actual values in matrix (13) we can see
that the probability mass does not centre sufficiently around the
diagonals in such a way that it can produce the correlations
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|CHSH| = 1.23 ≤ 2. The conceptual combination TOAST GAG
is therefore deemed to be ‘‘compositional’’ as a joint probability
distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2 can be constructed, which models how it
is interpreted within the given priming conditions.
TO
AS
T A1(jam)
+1
−1
A2(speech) +1−1
GAG
B2(choke)
+1 −1
B1(joke)
+1 −1
0.50 0.4375
0.0625 0
0.625 0.375
0 0
0.29 0
0.29 0.42
0.07 0.21
0.57 0.14
. (13)
APPLE CHIP
In contrast, APPLE CHIP leads to a joint distribution that has a
more interesting structure:
AP
PL
E A1(banana)
+1
−1
A2(computer) +1−1
CHIP
B1(potato)
+1 −1
B2(circuit)
+1 −1
0.94 0.06
0 0
0 0.75
0.25 0
0 0.35
0.65 0
0.47 0
0 0.53
. (14)
It is clear from the values in Table 1 that APPLE CHIP fails
marginal selectivity. Therefore the joint probability distribution
PrA1,A2,B1,B2 cannot be constructed from the four empirically col-
lected pairwise joint probability distributions such that these four
pairwise distributions depicted in matrix (14) can be recovered
by marginalising this four way joint distribution. This conceptual
combination is therefore deemed ‘‘non-compositional’’.
However, we claim that the status of this conceptual combina-
tion as non-compositional is likely to be more interesting than a
simple failure of marginal selectivity. APPLE CHIP shows a strong
pattern of correlation between the senses across the four priming
conditions because the probabilities are concentrated on the di-
agonals or reverse diagonals. Thus, whenever a subject interprets
APPLE as a fruit they tend to interpret CHIP in its FOOD sense. Con-
versely, if APPLE is interpreted as a ‘computer’ then a CHIP is inter-
preted as an ‘electronic device’. This structure was quite common
in the conceptual combinations that were studied. A second key
factor is that a non-zero value has been returned by the ensemble
of subjects for one off-diagonal case p2 = Pr(A1, B1) = 0.06 (see
Matrix (2)). Even though the food sense of CHIP has been primed,
atypical interpretations of the compound are produced, for exam-
ple, ‘‘apple’s growth is controlled by an internal chip’’. Costello and
Keane (2000) identify three categories of non-compositionality in
novel conceptual combinations, and atypical instances are at the
basis of one of these categories. Some other non-compositional
conceptual combinations showed similar atypical interpretations.
For example, BANK LOG also exhibits a strong correlation between
the senses: When BANK is interpreted as a financial institution,
LOG tends to be interpreted as a ‘‘record’’. Conversely, when BANK
is interpreted in it’s ‘‘river’’ sense, LOG is interpreted as a ‘‘piece of
wood’’. However, there were atypical cases where the senses cross
over which produces an off-diagonal probability e.g., ‘‘a record of a
bank of a river’’.
We hypothesise that one way for a conceptual combination to
satisfy marginal selectivity and yet be deemed non-compositional
involves a particular structure, which is demonstrated by the
example depicted in matrix (15). Here we see the probability
mass is largely concentrated along diagonals, because typicalinterpretations can often occur when senses are (anti-)correlating.
For example,whenAPPLE is interpreted as fruit, CHIP is interpreted
as food. The small off-diagonal probabilities reflect the atypical
interpretations of Costello and Keane (2000), which may signify
non-compositionality. Assuming each of quadrants in Matrix (15)
is based on 100 data points, then diff(A1) = 0.02 and the
95% confidence interval is [−0.07, 0.11]. Similarly, diff(A2) =
0.01[−0.06, 0.8], diff(B1) = 0.01[−0.10, 0.12] and diff(B2) =
0.01[−0.07, 0.09]. These figures demonstrate what the statistics
should look like when marginal selectivity is holding, i.e., the
differences in marginal probabilities are very small and the
confidence intervals are tightly centred around zero. In addition,
the probabilities in matrix (15) yield an absolute CHSH value
of 2.06. The atypical interpretations, highlighted by the bolded
probabilities, are what force the CHSH value to exceed the
threshold of two, and thus into non-compositionality.
A
A1 (prime a1) +1−1
A2 (prime a2) +1−1
B
B1 (prime b1)
+1 −1
B2 (prime b2)
+1 −1
0.85 0.05
0 0.10
0 0.92
0.08 0
0 0.06
0.86 0.08
0.07 0
0 0.93
 . (15)
4. Broader reflections on compositionality and non-
compositionality
A major contribution of this paper is its demonstration of
a methodology by which we might start to explore the debate
about compositionality empirically. One question that has not
yet been satisfactorily answered to date concerns the underlying
cause of languages’ apparently non-compositional behaviour: does
language just violate Marginal Selectivity, or is it possible that
some conceptual combinations might satisfy Marginal Selectivity
and yet violate a Bell type inequality? This paper has pointed to a
systematic way in which this question might be answered. While
the experiments discussed in Section 3 are not conclusive about
Marginal Selectivity, they do point towards some compounds that
could perhaps be shown to satisfy this property with a large
enough sample size. If such an experimental scenario was then
shown to violate a Bell-type inequality then we would have
learned much about the cognitive processes underlying language
comprehension. More experimentation is required.
The importance of definitively answering such a question canbe
illustrated with reference to Costello and Keane (2000), who clas-
sify non-compositional conceptual combinations into three cate-
gories depending upon how their apparent non-compositionality
arises. Firstly, some combinations are deemed non-compositional
because of emergent properties, which generally arise from a
meaning which is based on a subset of atypical instances. The
aforementioned PET FISH example is placed in this category.
A second set of conceptual combinations are classified non-
compositional due to the manner in which the senses of the com-
bining words are extended beyond their standard usage, to refer
to instances outside the categories usually named by those words.
Finally, some conceptual combinations are classified as non-
compositional because they make use of cognitive processes such
asmetaphor, analogy ormetonymy in their interpretation. Costello
and Keane (2000) use the conceptual combination SHOVEL BIRD to
illustrate all three categories:
1. A ‘‘shovel bird’’ could be a bird with a flat beak for digging up
food.
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you dig in the garden.
3. A ‘‘shovel bird’’ could be a plane that scoops upwater from lakes
to dump on fires.
4. A ‘‘shovel bird’’ could be a company logo stamped on the handle
of a shovel.
5. A ‘‘shovel bird’’ could be someone allowed out of jail (free as a
bird) as long as he works on a road crew.
They argue that (1) and (2) are examples of the first category be-
cause a bird with a flat beak is atypical, whereas (3) illustrates the
second category because it extends the sense of both SHOVEL and
BIRD beyond their normal usage. Finally (4) and (5) are put for-
ward as examples of third category due to theirmetaphoric nature.
Costello and Keane (2000) detail how their constraint-based the-
ory of conceptual combination specifically relates to each of these
categories. The framework presented in this paper, however, mod-
els the non-compositionality of SHOVEL BIRD irrespective of the
category of non-compositionality involved. For example, SHOVEL
has the sense of being a tool, or being shaped like a shovel. The
concept BIRD has three senses in the preceding example: relating
to an animal, a plane, and a prisoner. Thus, the concept BIRD could
be modelled as consisting of both a dominant ANIMAL (A1) and a
subordinate PLANE (A2) sense. In this more general scenario, the
broad class of Bell-type inequalities (including the CHSH, CH and
Fine variants discussed in this paper) could be applied to test for
the non-compositionality of each possible interpretation resulting
from a combination of SHOVEL with BIRD.
In addition, there is no requirement in the presented analytical
framework that the concepts be explicit homographs, it can
also be applied in a number of other scenarios. For example, a
weaker form of ambiguity, polysemy can also be explored with this
framework. A WordNet analysis of the noun–noun combinations
used in the compositional models explored by Mitchell and
Lapata (2010) reveals that the vast majority have more than
one synset and hence more than one shade of meaning, and
thus that they are polysemous (as was the case for the concept
SHOVEL above). Similarly, ambiguity could also derive from the
relations that link two conceptual combinations and thus our
framework could allow for a clarification as to which word is
acting as a head and which a modifier in conceptual combinations.
For example, the CARIN model assumes that relations apply
to the modifier, so in ADOLESCENT DOCTOR, an ambiguous
concept that is discussed by Gagne (2001), an ambiguity arises
between the competing relations in ‘‘doctor FOR adolescents’’
and ‘‘doctor IS adolescent’’. Both of these possibilities for the
concept ADOLESCENT could be accessed throughpriming, and then
probabilistically represented with their corresponding variables
A1 or A2 (Gagne (2001) provides an experimental procedure
for priming relations). DOCTOR is also ambiguous because it is
polysemous, e.g., amedical doctor, or someoneholding a Ph.D. Both
of these possibilities could bemodelled by the variables B1 and B2.
The analytical framework presented here could be applied to both
of these scenarios, and thus the study of (non-)compositionality in
conceptual combinations which have already been considered in
the psychological literature. The joint distribution criterion (JDC)
proposed by Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) provides an extension of
the framework presented here that could be put to sensible use in
testing these more general scenarios. This condition is decided by
solving a linear programming problemof the formMQ = P,Q ≥ 0.
In the context of this article, the vector P would comprise the
sixteen probabilities depicted in (2) and Q would represent the
global joint distribution PrA1,A2,B1,B2. Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012)
prove that if marginal selectivity does not hold, then there is no
solution for Q. If marginal selectivity holds and no distribution Q
can be found, then the associated conceptual combination can be
deemed non-compositional. The linear programming approach ismore general than the CHSH and Bell/CH inequalities in that it
applies to any number of random variables with any number of
possible values, and is a potentially rich area for consideration in
future work.
In summary, this paper has proposed a framework for
empirically testing the dividing line between compositionality
and non-compositionality, not an adjudication upon the ongoing
debate about compositionality in conceptual representation. One
test that we provide is based on the violation of the Bell class
of inequalities, but this can only be considered surprising in
a scenario where the other test (Marginal Selectivity) is also
satisfied. This is because, similarly to the locality condition in Bell-
type inequalities, Marginal Selectivity can be understood as the
underlying basis upon which a system could initially be assumed
to be separable in the first place. Amajor contribution of this paper
is a method capable of determining which of the two underlies
non-compositional behaviour. However, the determination of
compositionality that this analysis providesmust take into account
the priming conditions of the test, which empirically simulate
the context (e.g., the discourse context) of the interpretation. As
discussed by Kitto (2014), there is no result without a supplied
context (in this case the priming), and it is important that we
capture this information.
It appears that historically George Boole considered the prob-
lem of the constraints involved when trying to construct a
global distribution of three variables from pairwise joint distribu-
tions (Pitowsky, 1994), however, Vorob’ev discovered results con-
straining this approach, providing a set of results more general to
that of Fine’s theorem. Vorob’ev was ignored (Khrennikov, 2010),
apparently because his results pointed to the potential limits of
standard probability theory, which was gaining in popularity as it
was developed by Kolmogorov. Thus, it was quantum physics that
became famous for demonstrating the impossibility of modelling
entangled systems in a single probability space. In our opinion, this
is but a quirk of the past, and Dzhafarov and Kujala (2012) have
independently shown how such results can appear in cognitive
psychology. The history just sketched, together with the fact that
the Bell-type inequalities are based solely on conventional prob-
ability theory, opens the possibility to non-controversially apply
them outside of quantum physics (Aerts, Aerts, Broeckaert, & Gab-
ora, 2000; Aerts et al., 2014; Bruza, Kitto, Nelson, & McEvoy, 2009;
Khrennikov, 2010).
5. Conclusions
This article departed from the assumption that conceptual com-
binations may not exclusively exhibit compositional semantics.
The very idea of a non-compositional semantics has been resisted
in the literature spanning cognitive science, philosophy and lin-
guistics, probably because the ‘‘principle of compositionality’’ has
had such a significant track record of success over a long period.
It is, however, precisely the assumption that semantics must nec-
essarily be of a compositional form that has been regularly ques-
tioned in a wide range of literature. Despite this state of confusion,
few analytical approaches have been proposed that are capable of
demarcating the difference between the two forms of behaviour.
We have shown that it is possible to analyse the manner in which
the semantics of a given conceptual combination might be consid-
ered as compositional, or non-compositional. Indeed, it is perhaps
timely to remind the reader that we do not argue against composi-
tional semantics per se. Rather, we have tried in this article to shed
light on the line at which it breaks down: We believe that both
compositional and non-compositional models will be necessary in
order to provide a full account of the semantics of language.
Wemodelled the semantics of concepts in terms of the different
senses in which a concept may be understood, where a given
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ambiguous concept. These senses have a reliable intersubjective
cognitive underpinning, as they were grounded in terms of human
word association norm data, which was used to predict the
probability that a subject would attribute a particular sense to
an ambiguous concept. Utilising formal frameworks developed for
analysing composite systems in quantum theory, we presented
twomethods that allow the semantics of conceptual combinations
to be classified as ‘‘compositional’’ or ‘‘non-compositional’’. This
classification differs from previous research in two ways. Firstly,
compositionality is not graded, e.g., ‘‘weak’’ versus ‘‘strong’’
compositionality. Secondly, the declaration of compositionality, or
non-compositionality, is not an absolute classification, but context
sensitive. An empirical study of twenty-four novel conceptual
combinations illustrates how the classifications can be applied.
Important corollaries are:
• Conceptual combinations violating marginal selectivity can-
not be modelled in a single probability space across the four
variables modelling the respective interpretations of the con-
stituent concepts. Such conceptual combinations are immedi-
ately ‘‘non-compositional’’.
• Whenmarginal selectivity does hold, and the Bell-type inequal-
ities are not violated, then the semantics of the conceptual com-
bination cannot be modelled in a four way joint probability
distribution, the variables of which correspond to how the con-
stituent concepts are being interpreted in their respective dom-
inant and subordinate senses. Such conceptual combinations
are ‘‘compositional’’.
• When marginal selectivity does hold, and any of the Bell class
of inequalities are violated, then the semantics of the con-
ceptual combination cannot be modelled in a four way joint
probability distribution. Such conceptual combinations are
‘‘non-compositional’’.
This result could have amarked impact inmodelling cognitive phe-
nomena more generally, as these phenomena are frequently as-
sumed to be compositional, and no thought is given as to whether
the phenomenon can bemodelled within a given probability space
that themodeller constructs in terms of randomvariables. It is sim-
ply assumed that it can. Experiments from quantum physics show
that for entangled systems no such model exists.
Finally, this article adds further weight to the claim that
quantum theory is a fruitful source of new theoretical insights
and tools for modelling conceptual semantics, as it has already
done in other areas of cognition (Aerts, 2009; Aerts et al., 2013;
Blutner, Pothos, & Bruza, 2013; Bruza, Busemeyer, & Gabora,
2009; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012; Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, &
Trueblood, 2011; Khrennikov, 2010; Nelson et al., 2013; Pothos,
Busemeyer, & Trueblood, 2013).
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Appendix. Possible confounding factors
A number of factors beyond marginal selectivity must be con-
sidered when constructing experiments such as the ones intro-
duced here. Are the primes working as intended? How familiar
are the compound conceptual combinations? Could response time
be taken as an indicator that the experimental design is inap-
propriate? Factors such as these could influence the frequency of
resulting interpretations at a statistical level, and so must be care-
fully controlled. In this appendix we show that a number of possi-
ble confounding factors have been taken into account in this work,
demonstrating that the priming used in these experiments can be
considered effective, despite the complexity of the protocol.
A.1. Frequency of interpretations
The frequency of interpretations was analysed using Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests. The results are summarised in Fig. A.4.
As expected, overall participants gave significantly more
interpretations that were consistent with the primes (mean =
6.88), than inconsistent with the primes (mean = 4.72), z =
4.06, p < .0001. This provides evidence that the primes were
affecting the interpretations given in the correct direction. To
analyse whether the order in which the primes were shown had
an effect on number of interpretations, we divided the consistent
and inconsistent interpretations into whether the priming words
were in the same order or reverse order to that of the compound.
No significant differences were found. Furthermore, the priming
effect was still present within the priming order conditions. That
is, when prime order was the same, participants gave significantly
more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.20) than inconsistent
interpretations (mean = 2.32), z = 2.77, p = .006.
Likewise, when prime order was reversed, participants again gave
significantly more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.67) than
inconsistent interpretations (mean = 2.40), z = 3.34, p = .001.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence that the primingwas
effective, and that it is independent of priming order.
A.2. Response time
The speed of producing an interpretation was analysed
according towhether itwas consistent or inconsistentwith regards
to the priming words, and whether this was affected by prime
order. It was expected that if the priming was effective then
interpretations that were inconsistent with the primes would be
produced slower than interpretations that were consistent with
the primes. As seen in Fig. A.5, the mean response times were
in the correct direction. Since a number of participants did not
give responses for all of the categories, the number of participants
in the analysis was 51. The analysis showed no main effect of
Interpretation (p = 0.297), Prime Order (p = 0.718), nor
an Interpretation x Prime Order interaction (p = 0.994). One
likely reason for the non-significant effects is the large variance in
response times (range = 369–10,035 ms), thus making it difficult
for the mean differences to reach significance. For this reason we
feel that the frequency scores are more reliable measures, and
importantly these showed significant effects of priming.
P.D. Bruza et al. / Journal of Mathematical Psychology 67 (2015) 26–38 37Fig. A.5. Mean response time for producing interpretations (consistent or
inconsistent) with the primes by prime order (overall, same prime order, reverse
prime order) (a) mean response times (ms) before analysis (N = 65) (b) mean
response times (ms) used in ANOVA (N = 51).
A.3. Compound familiarity
One concern is that the evidence for non-compositionality
found in this study may be a function of familiarity. In particular,
highly familiar compounds would be expected to require less
combinatorial processing as the combined meaning may simply
be retrieved from long term memory. We consider this possibility
unlikely due to the experimental procedure followed. The fact
that both words are ambiguous allows the priming procedure to
shift participants into considering new combined meanings. For
instance, while most participants (86%) interpreted SPRING PLANT
as ‘‘a plant that grows in spring’’, when primed with ‘coil’ and
‘leaf’, 3% of participants gave the interpretation ‘‘a springy plant’’.
Thus these participants have arguably been influenced by priming
towards generating a newmeaning, even though a highly common
meaning already exists. In fact, as previously mentioned for spring
plant and other compounds the findings of non-compositionality
seem to depend upon participants producing novel meanings for
the compounds. This finding goes against the hypothesis that non-
compositionality is driven entirely by the retrieval of pre-stored
meanings. To test whether familiarity is associated with non-
compositionality, we obtained hit rates for each compound by
typing each into Google with quotes. This measure of familiarity
has been used in previous studies, e.g., (Ramm & Halford, 2012;
Wisniewski & Murphy, 2005). It was found that the novelty of
compounds based upon hit rates ranged from 144 (STAG YARN)
to 9,460,000 (BATTERY CHARGE). To reduce the large variance
obtained in the hit rates we transformed the scores into logs of ten.
If familiarity is driving the non-compositionality results it would
be expected that CHSH scores would be positively correlated
with Google hit rates. To test this we calculated a Pearson R
correlation. This showed a weak positive correlation between the
two variables, though this was non-significant, r = 0.21, p =
.337. Thus we did not find evidence for the hypothesis that the
non-compositionality of compounds in this study is driven by
familiarity. However, as there were only 24 compounds under
study, we acknowledge that there may not have been enough
power to derive a significant correlation.
More generally, the primes are an experimentally pragmatic
means to manipulate the manner in which context affects the in-
terpretation applied to conceptual combinations, and so they need
only influence the interpretation, not determine it. The violations
that do occur arise only with respect to the reported priming con-
ditions, and may not occur in a different experimental context.
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